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REGULATING ROBOCALLS AND MODERN DEBT 
COLLECTION PRACTICES—EXAMINING GOVERNMENTAL 
RESPONSES AND THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT 
IMPLICATIONS  
INTRODUCTION 
When people pick up their phones to answer a call, most individuals hope to 
speak with someone who is relaying an important message. With the recent 
influx of robocalls repeatedly dialing phone numbers, more people are becoming 
increasingly hesitant to accept a call when an unrecognizable string of numbers 
flashes across their phone screen. In a February 2019 report from the Federal 
Communications Commission, the agency reported that YouMail, a private 
company that collects information on call volume throughout the United States, 
estimated that upwards of 48 billion robocalls were placed in 2018, with 26.3 
billion of those calls being made to mobile phones.1  
In an effort to combat the growing influx of deceptive calls and mitigate the 
daily annoyance that these calls bring to consumers, the United States Congress, 
the Federal Communications Commission, and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau have sought to strengthen the regulations and penalties for 
telemarketers placing these calls and bolster the protections for consumers to 
prevent receiving these incessant calls.2 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) was passed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and applies 
to personal and household transactions.3 As federal agencies have increased 
their robocall and telemarketing regulations in efforts to protect American 
consumers from scams and deceptive call practices, debt collectors are 
increasingly being perceived as scammers. The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) has recently begun to respond to this issue by conducting 
 
 1 U.S. FED. COMM. COMMISSION, CONSUMER AND GOVERNMENTAL AFF. BUREAU, CG DOCKET NO. 17-
59, REPORT OF ROBOCALLS (2019).  
 2 The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-initiatives/fccs-push-combat-robocalls-spoofing. 
 In June of 2019, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that phone companies and 
individual consumers can opt-in to call blocking tools that stop robocalls from reaching 
consumers’ phones. The FCC has also levied large fines against telemarketing companies who 
have engaged in spoofing, which is a technique used by telemarketing companies that tricks 
consumers into thinking that they are getting a call from a local number, making them more likely 
to pick up the phone. 
Id. 
 3 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.  
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proposed rulemaking in order to better clarify permitted debt collection 
practices.4 Congress has also tried to respond to this issue by passing broader 
robocall statutes, such as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and 
the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act 
(TRACED Act), which both delegate authority to agencies to implement 
measures that better protect American consumers. Yet, regulating debt 
collectors’ communications also raises First Amendment concerns. These 
Congressional statutes that provide agencies and private entities with the 
authority to limit and block communications from debt collectors and 
robocallers could too greatly infringe one’s constitutionally protected First 
Amendment rights.  
The gap between permissible debt collection practices and ineffective 
federal robocall regulations demonstrates a shortcoming in policy-making where 
more specificity from the federal government is required to help dictate 
appropriate and effective parameters for legal debt collection practices. In order 
to properly protect debt collectors and debtors, federal agencies should amend 
their regulations to provide clearer and more useful rules for debt collectors 
when they try to recover their debts, while also ensuring that debt collectors are 
not effectively barred from trying to make good faith contact with the debtor. 
Additionally, in order to prevent the unconstitutional stifling of speech by debt 
collectors, Congress should amend its laws to more directly achieve its stated 
goals without being too over or under-inclusive of barring speech. 
This Comment will provide background information on the steps that 
Congress and federal agencies have taken to try to solve the issues surrounding 
robocalls and fair debt collection practices, specifically examining the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Federal Communication Commission’s 
declaratory rulings on call blocking, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s notice of proposed rulemaking, the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act (TCPA), and the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and 
Deterrence Act (TRACED Act). This Comment will examine the provisions and 
shortcomings of these statutes and regulations. Two notable shortcomings 
include the FCC employing over-broad standards to detect fraudulent calls and 
pre-emptively blocking those calls from reaching consumers, as well as the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act allowing consumers to cease all communications 
with debt collectors.  
 
 4 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/. 
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This Comment will then examine the growing First Amendment concerns 
surrounding these provisions and apply a First Amendment analysis to the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act and the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal 
Enforcement and Deterrence Act. Under a First Amendment analysis, the 
FDCPA could fail under a content-based strict scrutiny standard of review and 
under a commercial speech intermediate scrutiny standard of review, while the 
TRACED Act may be able to survive an intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act will be the first provision 
analyzed below.  
I. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
A. The Creation of CFPB 
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in 1977 
with the goal of preventing debt collectors from utilizing abusive debt collection 
practices against consumers.5 In 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
Act, the CFPB was created and granted concurrent authority with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to oversee debt collection practices and enforce the 
goals and provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.6 More recently in May of 2019, the 
CFPB decided to take action by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that 
seeks to provide consumers with stronger protections against debt collectors.7 
The notice of proposed rulemaking highlighted the CFPB’s intention to place 
limits on the number of calls that can be placed to debtors each week, to outline 
how debt collectors can utilize new technology to reach consumers, and its plan 
to require debt collectors to provide more information to consumers on how to 
respond to calls for the collection of their debts.8 The notice of proposed 
rulemaking specifically addresses new communications technology, such as text 
messaging, emails, and voicemails, that were unaddressed by the initial passing 
of the FDCPA.9 These regulations seek to modernize the FDCPA to address 
modern needs unique from the debt collection practices at the time of the law’s 
passage. 
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 allowed the FDCPA to be 
adapted to issues concerning consumers and debtors in a modern economy. Prior 
 
 5 Mattson, supra. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, supra. 
 8 Mattson, supra.  
 9 Id. 
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to 2010, the FTC retained a majority of the enforcement role for the FDCPA. 
The FTC could work in conjunction with other federal agencies whose work 
related to a party identified to be the subject of an FDCPA enforcement action.10 
The FTC was permitted under the FDCPA to issue advisory opinions on the 
proper application of the statute, but the agency lacked power delegated from 
Congress to create new rules and regulations to meet the growing challenges of 
a constantly modernizing consumer landscape.11 The Dodd-Frank Act created 
the CFPB and delegated authority to the Bureau to create new rules for debt 
collection practices.12 The purpose of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
is to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and take action 
against companies that break the law.”13 The agency’s supervisory authority is 
wide-ranging and includes financial institutions, depository institutions with 
assets over $10 billion, mortgage-related businesses, pay day lenders, student 
lenders, and financial companies—including debt collectors.14  
B. Who the FDCPA Applies To 
The FDCPA applies directly to the conduct of debt collectors,15 which 
includes any act that is taken “in connection with the collection of any debt.”16 
In order to qualify as a debt collector, the primary purpose of the actor must be 
to collect debts.17 Debt collection agencies are encompassed in the definition of 
debt collection since their primary business is based on the collection of debts. 
Under the FDCPA, an individual attempting to collect a debt from a consumer 
on behalf of the creditor is not necessarily a debt collector.18 People who collect 
consumer debt that is not at default at the time of purchasing the debt are not 
held as debt collectors, but those who purchase debts, such as debts that are part 
 
 10 Id. Other regulatory agencies would sometimes include the Federal Reserve Board, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, National 
Credit Union Administration, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. 
 11 Id.  
 12 Id.  
 13 The Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (last visited Nov. 26, 2019), https://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/. 
 14 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 15 Mattson, supra §1.03. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Id. An entity that collects debts while in the course of conducting other business does not qualify as a 
debt collector under the FDCPA. Id. 
 18 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. An example of this situation is where a car dealership makes collection calls for its 
finance company. Id. 
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of loan portfolios, that are in default at the time purchase are held to be debt 
collectors for the purposes of the Act.19  
Case law has demonstrated a willingness by the courts to treat individuals as 
debt collectors under the FDCPA when through their communications with 
debtors, the caller requesting payment acts as if a debt is in default even if the 
debt has already been repaid. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bridge v. 
Ocwen Federal Bank20 held that a debt collector includes “any non-originating 
debt holder that either acquired the debt in default or has treated the debt as if it 
were in default at time of acquisition.”21 Through this ruling, the Sixth Circuit 
placed these debt collectors under the authority and limitations of the FDCPA 
for merely treating a perceived debt as if it was in default, thus opening debt 
collectors up to penalty for their mistakes or lack of updated information on the 
status of a debt.22 Harvesters of phone numbers can also be deemed debt 
collectors. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Romine v. Diversified 
Collection Services, Inc.23 held that when the Automated Voice Telegram 
System service obtained debtors’ phone numbers and subsequently provided 
those numbers to creditors and collection agencies, that third party’s conduct 
would be enough to deem the company a debt collector.24 The court relied on 
the legislative history of the FDCPA and argued that the purpose of the statute 
is to “limit harassing, misleading, and fraudulent contacts and communications 
with or about consumer debtors. . . . Most of the ‘collection abuses’ outlined in 
 
 19 Mattson, supra §1.03. 
 20 Id. (see Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 355–64 (6th Cir. 2012)). In Bridge, Lisa Bridge 
signed a mortgage and note for a home. William Bridge did not sign the note but signed the mortgage. There 
was confusion as to whether Lisa made her April 2002 mortgage loan payment due to a question of availability 
of funds. Lisa asserts that she made two mortgage payments in April 2002, even though only one payment was 
recorded. Lisa and William filed a complaint that asserted that Ocwen placed multiple phone calls to engage in 
debt collection for the alleged debt owed by Lisa Bridge and that these debt collection calls violated the FDCPA. 
In her third amended complaint, the Northern District of Ohio held that Lisa Bridge lost in her claim of violation 
of the FDCPA, because she failed to allege that Ocwen’s debt collection practices were “false and misleading, 
unfair, harassing, abusive, or otherwise violated the FDCPA.” Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, No. 1:07 CV 2739, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74192, at *26 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2014).  
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Mattson, supra §1.03 (citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1143–49 (9th Cir. 
1998)). In Romine, Diversified Collection Services (DCS), a debt collection agency, hired Western Union for its 
Automated Voice Telegram (AVT) service. The AVT service sends notices to debtors to call the AVT service. 
Once the call is placed, Western Union collects the debtor’s phone number and personal information and sends 
that information to DCS. Here, the petitioner called Western Union after getting a notification and was not told 
that the purpose of the call was to collect a debt that they allegedly owed. AVT then sent DCS the debtor’s 
information. DCS used the petitioner’s newly acquired phone number to contact the debtor on multiple 
occasions. Romine, 155 F.3d at 1143–49. 
 24 Id. (citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1143–49 (9th Cir. 1998)).  
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the legislative history involve improper contacts with consumer debtors.”25 If 
Congress intended to limit the term debt collector to just include registered debt 
collection agencies and exclude non-registered third parties whose work 
includes collecting debts, it would have specified the limitation.26 Because of 
both Western Union’s advertised service to catalyze debt collection through its 
urgent contacts with debtors, as well as its conduct through the collection of 
phone numbers and personal information of debtors, Western Union was liable 
as a debt collector under the FDCPA.27 
C. Restrictions Placed on Debt Collectors under the FDCPA 
Along with its defining debt collection in a way that protects consumers, the 
FDCPA attempts to impose restrictions on how a debt collector may contact a 
debtor.28 In general, a debt collector cannot engage in conduct that would 
“harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt.”29 
The debt collector also may not try to make contact with a debtor at inconvenient 
and impermissible times and places, as well as through unauthorized persons.  
1. Unusual Times and Places 
Debt collectors are not permitted to communicate with consumers during 
unusual times or places, or at any time or place that the collectors know would 
be an inconvenience for that debtor.30 The debt collector is required to operate 
on the assumption that a convenient time to communicate with the consumer is 
between 8:00 a.m. and 9 p.m.31 A violation occurs if the consumer indicates to 
the collector that they work a night shift and the collector proceeds to call during 
early morning hours when the individual is likely to be asleep.32 Absent consent, 
communications taking place at the consumer’s place of employment are also 
prohibited if the debt collector is aware that the employer prohibits the employee 
from receiving those types of communications in the workplace.33  
 
 25 Romine, 155 F.3d at 1149.  
 26 Id. at 1146. 
 27 Id. at 1149.  
 28 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
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2. Locating and Communicating with Individuals 
If the collector is attempting to locate the debtor, they may not tell the state 
where the debtor lives that the individual owes a debt.34 The collector also may 
not communicate with a person more than once to track down the location of the 
debtor unless the first response was erroneous.35 In terms of communicating with 
an individual, debt collectors may not use language on a mailed envelope or in 
its contents indicating that the debt collector is seeking to collect a debt from the 
recipient or that the communication relates to such topic, or communicate with 
anyone other than a debtor’s attorney if the debtor retains counsel for the 
matter.36 A debt collector is also prohibited from communicating about the debts 
with anyone other than the consumer, their retained attorney, a consumer-
reporting agency, the creditor, and the creditor’s attorney.37  
D. Restrictions under Section 1692(d) 
Under §1692(d) of the FDCPA, a debt collector may not engage in conduct 
to recover debts whose consequences include harassing, oppressing, or abusing 
any person related to the debt.38 The following list provides six categories of 
activities that are prohibited under this section. 
1. Violence & Other Criminal Means 
First, a debt collector cannot threaten or use violence or any other criminal 
means to harm a person’s property, reputation, or person. This includes 
protection for third parties in the debtor’s life, such as their employer, 
coworkers, friends, and family.39  
2. Obscene or Profane Language 
Second, the debt collector is not permitted to use obscene or profane 
language or language that would offend the hearer.40 Obscenity is defined as, 
“(1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  
 38 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
HARRISONFINAL_5.7.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 9:36 AM 
74 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 7 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.”41 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defined profane as “denoting 
certain of those personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent 
resentment or denoting language which under contemporary community 
standards is so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it 
as to amount to a nuisance.”42 Oftentimes, this is a fact specific inquiry for the 
court. Sexual innuendos, racial slurs, name-calling, stereotyping, and 
overzealous insults tend to be recognized by the court as being obscene and 
profane language.43 Additionally, the profane or obscene message does not have 
to be directly relayed to the debtor. The debtor does not have to read or hear the 
original language in order for the natural consequence of the language to qualify 
as harassing, oppressing, or abusing the individual.44  
3. Published Lists 
The third category of impermissible conduct states that debt collectors may 
not publish lists of consumers who have failed to pay their debts.45  
4. Advertising Sale of Debt 
Fourth, a debt collector is not permitted to advertise a debt for sale in order 
to elicit payment of the debt from the debtor.46 Advertising the sale of a debt 
could be viewed as a method to pressure the debtor to pay back their debts.47 
However, a debt collector is permitted to place advertisements for the sale of the 
debt as long as the advertisement’s purpose is not to elicit payment from the 
debtor.48  
 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. (quoting Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)).  
 43 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 44 Id. An example is where a debt collector leaves a message for the individual that is harassing in nature. 
The consumer did not have to hear or read this message contemporaneously for it to qualify as being harassing 
in nature. Id.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. Debts can be sold by debt collectors on a secondary market. Id. The purchasers of debt will try to 
recover the outstanding debts and are paid once the debts are re-paid. Amy Fontinelle, How the Debt Collection 
Agency Business Works, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 6, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/ 
121514/how-debt-collection-agency-business-works.asp. 
 47 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 48 Id. 
HARRISONFINAL_5.7.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 9:36 AM 
2020] REGULATING ROBOCALLS 75 
5. Telephone Harassment 
Fifth, telephone harassment is prohibited. The collector may not cause the 
phone to ring repeatedly and continuously with the intent to “annoy, abuse, or 
harass” the person who is called.49 The creditor also may not engage in repeated 
phone conversations to harass the individual.50 Because the Act specifically 
prohibits repeated telephone calls, the debt collector needs to consider the 
number of times that they are placing their calls. If the debtor terminates a call, 
the debt collector calling the debtor back contemporaneously with the end of the 
prior call would most likely count as harassment.51 
6. Caller Identity  
Sixth, debt collectors may not place these calls without disclosure of the 
caller’s identity.52 The FDCPA does not prohibit individuals from telling the 
debtor a trade name or alias. This is permitted because there is still a meaningful 
disclosure of the caller’s identity, regardless of whether the individual placing 
the call reveals their full name.53 
E. Affirmative Protections for Debtors 
The FDCPA includes proactive protections for the debtor, such as permitting 
the debtor to notify the debt collector that they either refuse to pay the debt or 
express their wish for the debt collector to stop further communication.54 If 
either of these wishes are demonstrated by the debtor, the debt collector must 
respect the consumer’s wishes and communication must come to a complete 
stop.55 This bar to communication excludes the debt collector stating that their 
debt collection efforts are being terminated, notifying the debtor that the debt 
collector will remedy the debt by enforcing payment in court, and notifying the 
consumer that the debtor intends to invoke a special remedy not ordinarily 
utilized.56 A lawyer could constitute a debt collector under FDCPA for their 
communications with the debtor. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Romine 
highlighted that a lawyer who is engaged in litigation to cover debts owed to the 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  
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creditor could constitute debt collection.57 The Supreme Court in Heintz v. 
Jenkins stated that “Litigation . . . seems simply one way of collecting debt.”58 
The question remains whether a consumer could stop a lawsuit by barring 
further communications between themselves and the debt collector. The 
Supreme Court in Heintz59 held that while it would be strange for the Act to 
permit the consumer to stop communications relating to a lawsuit and cause the 
litigation to cease, the statute already prevents this scenario by allowing the debt 
collector to argue that they are notifying the debtor that they are invoking a 
special remedy, which could mean that the creditor is going to enforce payment 
of the debt in court.60 To prevent additional liability as a debt collector, attorneys 
for the debt collector who are notified of the debtor’s wishes to end 
communications should avoid communications with the debtor that are not 
specifically related to the procedure of the unfolding litigation.61  
Even though the debtor can cut off communication with the debt collector, 
this protection may be waived. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Clark v. 
Capital Credit & Collection Services held that when a consumer communicates 
their wishes to terminate contact but subsequently contacts the debt collector, 
the consumer effectively waived their right to cease contact.62 In applying this 
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Shuler v. Ingram & Associates 
held that a collector’s five phone calls to debtor, which included one successful 
contact and two voicemails after the debtor’s request to cut off communication, 
did not amount to harassment since the calls were made after the debtor 
contacted the collector to engage in further discussions regarding their debt. The 
debtor’s communication was effectively a waiver of the right to terminate 
communications.63  
As seen above, the FDCPA places restrictions on the methods by which a 
debt collector can contact a debtor to collect outstanding debts. In efforts to 
 
 57 Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 58 Id. (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297–98 (1995)). 
 59 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–99 (1995)). In Heintz, Jenkins borrowed 
money from a bank to purchase a car. The bank’s lawyer, Heintz, filed a lawsuit in state court in order to recover 
the balance of the debt. The bank’s attorney sent a letter to Jenkins’s attorney, which listed the amount owed 
and the cost of the insurance purchased by the bank as a result of the debtor’s failure to insure the vehicle. Jenkins 
argued that Heintz and his law firm violated the FDCPA, because they sought to recover money that was not 
included in the original loan agreement. Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (citing Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1166–79 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 63 Id. (citing Shuler v. Ingram & Assocs., 441 F. App’x 712, 714–21 (11th Cir. 2011)).  
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better clarify the FDCPA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s notice of 
proposed rulemaking seeks to be able to provide more guidance to debt 
collectors on appropriate methods of communication, specifically addressing 
phone calls and limited content messages.64  
II. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S NOTICE OF 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING 
A. Limits on Phone Calls and Limited Content Messages 
In its notice of proposed rule making, the CFPB asserts that the agency’s 
new regulations will seek to promulgate clearer standards for debt collectors 
when communicating with consumers through modern forms of communication, 
including emails, text messages, and voice mails.65 Because these methods of 
communication are more sophisticated than simply placing phone calls, 
consumers have greater control in deciding how and when they interact with 
others. While these methods together provide a wider array of possibilities for 
contact with the consumer, they also provide easier ways to avoid 
communication. Consumers can choose to ignore emails, can more readily 
examine the identity of the person or company trying to make contact with them, 
and could decline contact altogether. Individuals using social media platforms 
can selectively choose their security settings to block contact and 
communication with unknown third parties, as well as restrict their ability to be 
identified by other users.66  
The CFPB plans to use the term, limited-content message, to identify the 
amount of information that a debt collector is allowed to include in messages 
sent to consumers without invoking the requirements of being a communication 
under the FDCPA.67 This is significant since the proposed rule seeks to impose 
stricter requirements on the number of communications that debt collectors are 
permitted to make to consumers. Examples of limited-content messages include 
leaving voicemails or sending text messages to consumers’ phones.68 Because 
the proposed rule would allow leaving a limited content message, debt collectors 
 
 64 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance. 
gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection-NPRM.pdf. 
 67 Id. at 6. 
 68 Id. at 7.  
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could be discouraged from engaging in continuous phone calls in efforts to 
convey their message to consumers.  
The notice of proposed rulemaking places limits on the number of calls, or 
communications, that can be placed to debtors. Debt collectors would be 
permitted to make no more than seven attempted calls per debt within one 
week.69 This provision has drawn criticism by consumer watchdog groups who 
are concerned that seven calls per week per debt can quickly become excessive, 
especially when individuals have multiple debts and have not formally opted-
out of receiving text messages, e-mails, or voice-mails.70  
As will be seen below, the CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking to limit 
the number of calls attempted by debt collectors to seven attempts per week71 
follows in step with the FCC’s opt-in call blocking system and the FTC’s Do 
Not Call Registry. These collective efforts to greatly limit the number of calls 
getting through to consumers act as a major barrier for debt collectors and 
robocallers alike. 
III. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION REGULATIONS  
A. FCC Regulations and Efforts to Block Calls 
On June 6, 2019, the Federal Communications Commission issued a 
declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking that allows phone 
companies to proactively block what they deem to be unwanted calls from 
reaching consumers.72 The decision by phone companies whether to block calls 
from incoming phone numbers shall be based on “reasonable call analytics.”73 
Reasonable call analytics could include factors such as, “large bursts of calls in 
a short timeframe; low average call duration; low call completion ratios . . . a 
large volume of complaints related to a suspect line; [and] sequential dialing 
 
 69 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/. 
 70 Consumer Watchdog’s Proposed Debt Collection Rule Bits Consumers: Authorizes Harassment by 
Debt Collectors, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (May 7, 2019), https://www.nclc.org/media-
center/consumer-watchdogs-proposed-debt-collection-rule-bites-consumers-authorizes-harassment-by-debt-
collectors.html. 
 71 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, supra.  
 72 FCC AFFIRMS ROBOCALL BLOCKING BY DEFAULT TO HELP PROTECT CONSUMERS, Federal Comm. 
Commission (June 6, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357852A1.pdf. 
 73 Id. 
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patterns.”74 Companies are allowed to make these proactive call-blocking 
decisions on behalf of consumers as long as customers are aware of the call-
blocking program and know that they have the option to opt-out.75 Phone 
providers may also allow customers to opt-in to call blocking tools that would 
block phone calls from numbers that are not listed in a consumer’s contact list 
from ever reaching their phone.76 In effect, this opt-in program permits 
consumers to designate who they are willing to receive calls from specifically 
according to the phone numbers that are identified on their contact list.  
The FCC in their declaratory ruling states that it believes the benefit to 
consumers from offering opt-out call blocking services will exceed the costs 
incurred by telemarketers and businesses that try to establish communication 
with consumers but ultimately fail as a result.77 The ruling cites that YouMail, a 
private company that collects information on call volume throughout the United 
States, reported that half of the top twenty spam callers were categorized as debt 
collection callers.78 In addition to this finding, the Federal Trade Commission 
compiled reports of complaints filed by consumers and organized those 
complaints by category of communication. In the last fully published report 
issued in 2016, debt collection calls were the highest reported calls complained 
of by consumers.79 Of the over 3 million complaints, debt collection calls were 
the highest reported complaint reaching 28% of the overall complaints filed.80  
B. FTC Regulations and the Do Not Call Registry 
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission started the National Do Not Call 
Registry, which provides a method for Americans to block calls from specific 
phone numbers.81 This service mainly serves individuals who are trying to block 
calls from telemarketers and salespersons. Once a phone number is added to the 
registry, the consumer’s phone number must be removed from the company’s 
 
 74 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor, 
47 C.F.R. §64 at 13 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.  
 75 Id. at 12.  
 76 Id. at 15.  
 77 Id. at 14. 
 78 Id. at 4.  
 79 FTC CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK at 78 (2016) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december-2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book. 
pdf. The report defined debt collection calls as “repeatedly or continuously, falsely represents the amount or 
status of debt, fails to send written notice of debt, falsely threatens suits, uses profane language, fails to identify 
self as debt collections and/or violates other provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” Id.  
 80 Id. at 3.  
 81 The Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/media-resources/do-not-call-registry. 
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call list within 31-day cycles.82 In the FTC’s Fiscal Year 2018 report, the most 
common complaint filed with the registry pertained to calls relating to 
“Reducing Debt” or debt collectors.83 In 2018, 729,366 complaints were filed 
against debt collectors. 641,734 complaints were for debt collectors who 
contacted consumers via robocall. 87,632 of the complaints were filed against 
live callers.84  
The FDCPA and the CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking seek to establish 
clear standards for debt collectors to follow when placing debt collection calls.85 
The FCC’s 2019 declaratory ruling broadens the scope of regulation to permit 
phone companies to implement call-blocking technologies for phone numbers 
that are suspected to be fraudulent,86 and the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry gives 
power to consumers to proactively halt repeated telemarketing calls.87 Congress 
itself through the TCPA and the TRACED Act sought to provide clearer and 
stricter restrictions on placing robocalls without solely singling out debt 
collection calls. The overarching goals of both statutes, which will be analyzed 
below, are to ensure consumer privacy and protection from fraudulent and illegal 
robocalls.  
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO TELEMARKETING AND DEBT COLLECTION: 
THE TCPA AND THE TRACED ACT 
A. The Creation of the TCPA 
In an attempt to combat growing issues relating to telemarketers, Congress 
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 1991.88 The TCPA restricts 
telemarketing calls made by automated dialing systems and pre-recorded voices 
 
 82 Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2018: About the National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-
reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fy-6. 
 83 Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2018: Complaint Figures for FY 2018, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-reports/national-do-
not-call-registry-data-book-fy-6. 
 84 Id.  
 85 See KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATION §1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.; See Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 
(2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection-NPRM.pdf. 
 86 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor, 
47 C.F.R. §64 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf. 
 87 The Do Not Call Registry, supra.  
 88 FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-and-
robocalls (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).  
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from reaching consumers.89 The 1991 law makes it unlawful for any person90 to 
place a call using automatic dialing or artificial prerecorded voices without the 
prior express consent of the consumer.91 A telemarketing call is defined as “the 
initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the 
purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is 
transmitted to any person.”92  
B. Consent Requirements and Exemptions 
The FCC’s 2013 enforcement rule implementing the TCPA required 
companies to obtain written consent before placing auto-dialed and pre-recorded 
calls to consumers. The 2013 rule also removed an exception that allowed 
businesses with an established business relationship with the consumer to place 
prerecorded telemarketing calls to consumers’ residential landlines.93 
Regardless of whether there was an existing business relationship, the 2013 rule 
required the business to obtain written consent before a pre-recorded call could 
be placed to the residential landline.94 The rule also mandated that when the 
automated call is made, businesses are required to provide consumers with an 
automated opt-out feature, allowing them to immediately block the telemarketer 
from calling them.95 Congress later changed the written consent requirement in 
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 to exempt robocalls that were “made solely 
to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States” from the consent 
requirements.96  
The FCC justified this rollback of the consent requirements for debt 
collection services by highlighting that if debt collectors cannot contact 
consumers, debtors are at a greater threat of accumulating larger quantities of 
 
 89 Id.  
 90 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72 
(2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-16-
72A1.pdf. The TCPA defines “person” as an individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, or 
corporation. Id. at 2.  
 91 Michael P. Daly et al., New Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) Rules Take Effect on 
October 16, 2013, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-
telephone-consumer-protection-act-1991-tcpa-rules-take-effect-october-16-2013. 
 92 47 U.S.C.S. § 227(a)(4) (2019).  
 93 Daly et al., supra.  
 94 Id.  
 95 FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-and-
robocalls (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 96 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, §301, 129 Stat. 584 (2015) (amending  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)). 
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debt.97 These debt collection calls for debts owed to the United States 
government were limited to three calls within a 30-day period.98 The Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2015 made this exemption before the FCC had the opportunity to 
address whether government contractors were subject to the TCPA. The 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 pre-empted agency rulemaking by ensuring that 
debt collection calls placed by government contractors were exempt from TCPA 
consent requirements, regardless of future agency rulemaking that would 
attempt to regulate government contractors under the purview of the TCPA.99  
In a 2016 declaratory ruling issued by the FCC, the agency clarified the 
TCPA rules applying to prerecorded phone calls and text messages placed by 
the government and directed to consumers.100 In one of three petitions filed, 
Broadnet Teleservices LLC asked the FCC to order that federal, state, and local 
governments are not labeled as “persons” for the purposes of the TCPA.101 If the 
government qualifies as a person under the TCPA, then it cannot place pre-
recorded or autodialed calls without following the statute’s consent 
requirements. The Commission agreed with Broadnet and reasoned that if 
Congress intended to define the government as a “person” under the TCPA, the 
statute would have included the government in its definition. Including the 
government in the TCPA’s definition of a person would place the government 
under TCPA restrictions and would significantly inhibit the government’s ability 
to make contact with citizens.102  
In addition to government exemptions, the FCC ordered that the term 
“person” does not include a contractor who is working on behalf of the federal 
government.103 In order to claim the same exemption as the government under 
the TCPA, the contractor must be authorized to act as a government agent, act 
within the scope of its contractual relationship with the government, and the 
 
 97 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-99, 1, 
2 (2016) (Report and Order). 
 98 Id. The idea behind the exemption is that if consumers cannot be contacted and informed of their debts, 
then consumers will continue to be uninformed about what they owe, leading to greater financial burden. Id. 
 99 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1, 
12 n.96 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/ 
FCC-16-72A1.pdf. 
 100 Id. at 6–11. 
 101 Id. at 8.  
 102 Id. at 8. Types of communication that could be inhibited would include telephone calls to collect data 
for policy determinations, conducting phone surveys, and disseminating information regarding government 
assistance programs. Id. 
 103 Id. at 9.  
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government must have given the contractor the authority to make the 
prerecorded or autodialed calls.104  
To support its narrowed definition of “person” under the TCPA, the FCC 
relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez.105 
Plaintiff claimed that Campbell-Ewald, a government contractor recruiting for 
the United States Navy, violated the TCPA by sending automated text messages 
to recruits who did not consent to receiving them.106 The Court maintained that 
the government and federal agencies are not subject to TCPA prohibitions, and 
government contractors may claim derivative immunity when they act based on 
authority properly designated to them by the federal government.107 In 
Campbell-Ewald, however, Campbell-Ewald Co. did not have derivative 
immunity because Campbell-Ewald Co. sent unauthorized text messages, which 
exceeded the scope of the company’s authority from the government. The Navy 
gave Campbell-Ewald Co. specific instructions to “send text messages only to 
individuals who had ‘opted in’ to receive solicitations.”108 Campbell-Ewald also 
promised to only use an opt-in list for sending out the text messages.109 The 
company failed to follow its grant of authority and uphold its promises to the 
government and therefore lacked derivative immunity from TCPA violations.110  
The Court in Campbell-Ewald did not hold that federal contractors 
categorically have the same immunity from liability under the TCPA. The Court 
also did not answer the question of whether federal contractors are “persons” 
under the TCPA. The Court’s holding, that federal contractors who act as agents 
of the federal government under agency law have derivative immunity from the 
TCPA,111 is consistent with the FCC’s 2016 declaratory ruling. The FCC ruled 
that federal contractors, or those who act as agents of the federal government, 
are not “persons” subject to TCPA requirements.112 In Campbell-Ewald, 
 
 104 Id. The FCC was concerned that based on principles of agency law, the federal government could be 
held vicariously liable for the calls placed by a hired contractor. In the FCC’s DISH Declaratory Ruling, the 
FCC allowed a third party placing a call under the direction of the principle to claim the same privilege belonging 
to the principle. By allowing the contractors to be liable in the case, the federal government could incur vicarious 
liability, which could lead to increased litigation and lawsuits. DISH Network, LLC Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC 
Rcd. 6574 6589, ¶ 38 (2013).  
 105 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, at 
11. 
 106 Id. at 11 
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. at 11 (quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 673–74. (2016)) 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. at 5 (citing Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673–74). 
 111 Id. at 11–12. 
 112 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1, 
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because the government contractor violated the government’s instructions, the 
company violated the authority granted to it by the government and therefore 
lost its immunity from TCPA liability.113 Therefore, the contractor would be 
considered a “person” under the TCPA.114  
The TCPA’s consent requirements for individuals to place auto-dialed or 
prerecorded calls created stricter minimum standards for robocalls to be placed. 
These statuary barriers to contacting consumers through robocalls raise First 
Amendment questions as to whether the law unconstitutionally inhibits one’s 
freedom of speech to make contact with consumers through these means.  
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE TCPA 
Due to the sweeping effect that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act has 
on preventing robocallers from reaching citizens, there are mounting First 
Amendment concerns that the statute stifles the freedom of speech. In Martin v. 
Struthers, a landmark First Amendment decision, the Supreme Court held that a 
city ordinance that made it unlawful for a person to distribute “handbills, 
circulars, or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocked, 
or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the 
purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars, or other advertisements” violated 
the First Amendment.115 The Court was forced to balance the interests of the 
homeowner in deciding whether they would receive the message against the 
interests in protecting citizens. The Court held that evaluating the dangers of 
accepting the distributed materials should be left to each homeowner to decide 
and that the “stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by 
the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.”116 
To decide whether a statute too greatly restricts the freedom of speech, the 
appropriate level of scrutiny must be applied to evaluate the law. The first step 
in applying the appropriate level of scrutiny requires courts to examine whether 
the statute is content-based or content-neutral.117 A content-based law is 
presumed to be unconstitutional, because it regulates speech based on its subject 
 
8 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-16-
72A1.pdf. 
 113 Id. at 12. 
 114 Id.  
 115 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943). 
 116 Id. at 146–47.  
 117 Minch Minchin, Article, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 123, 123–24 (2017). 
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matter.118 Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny from the court, which 
is the toughest form of judicial scrutiny to overcome.119 To pass a strict scrutiny 
standard of review, the law must “further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ 
and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.”120 Justice 
Thomas in Reed v. Town of Gilbert explained the standard for content-based 
regulation of speech as “apply[ing] to particular speech because of the topic 
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”121 This standard “requires a court 
to consider whether a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based 
on the message a speaker conveys.”122 If the court cannot determine if the statute 
is facially content-based, then the court is permitted to examine the purpose and 
effects of the statute.123  
Content neutral laws regulate speech by limiting expression without concern 
for the substance of the speech itself.124 These laws are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.125 Content neutral laws oftentimes address the time, place, or manner 
of the speech.126 In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, the law must “further an 
important government interest . . . and must do so by means that are substantially 
related to that interest.”127 
U.S. federal courts have applied this framework to determine whether the 
TCPA is constitutional. First, a reviewing court must determine whether the 
statute is content-based or content-neutral. Second, the appropriate level of 
scrutiny is applied to the statute to determine whether its speech regulations are 
permissible.  
 
 118 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224–33 (2015). In Reed, the Supreme Court invalidated an 
Arizona ordinance that treated directional signs differently based on the content of the sign. For example, if the 
sign gave directions to a local church or espoused a political view, then that type of sign was regulated differently 
than a non-ideological sign. The majority held that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny from the 
Court. Id. 
 119 Minchin, supra at 124.  
 120 Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 121 Reed, at 2227. 
 122 Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564–66 (2011)).  
 123 Id. at 2227. 
 124 David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. An example of content neutral speech is in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, where Minnesota prohibited the sale of any merchandise or printed materials in parks. Id. (citing 
Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).  
 127 Intermediate Scrutiny, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
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A. Declaring the Debt Collection Exception Unconstitutional  
In March 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duguid v. Facebook, 
Inc. declared that the 2015 debt-collection exception to the TCPA is 
unconstitutional. In Duguid, Facebook began to send Duguid text messages in 
January 2014, even though Duguid did not have a Facebook account. Duguid 
tried to opt-out of the messages by sending an email requesting Facebook cease 
sending the text messages. The messages continued to be sent to Duguid. 
Facebook argued that the pleadings should be dismissed, because the messages 
fall under the emergency purpose exception under the TCPA.128 The FCC has 
defined the emergency purpose exception to mean “calls made necessary in any 
situation affecting the health and safety of consumers.”129 
Along with its emergency purpose defense, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Facebook has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the TCPA and the 
amendments made to the Act in 2015. The first inquiry in a First Amendment 
analysis is whether the TCPA is a content neutral or content-based statute.130 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. held that 
the pre-2015 amended TCPA was content-neutral and passed intermediate 
scrutiny.131 The court in Duguid followed its own precedent that the TCPA was 
narrowly tailored and advanced the “‘government’s significant interest in 
residential privacy’ and left open ‘ample alternative channels of 
communication.’”132 Yet, the court further held that adding the debt-collection 
exception to the consent requirements for robocalls changes the nature of the 
TCPA and the First Amendment analysis framework.133 With the debt collection 
exception, the TCPA places favor in speech whose purpose is to collect a debt 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States. This exception makes the statute 
content-based, because it examines speech for exemptions based on its content. 
Therefore, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny.134  
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must demonstrate that 
differentiating between robocalls to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States is a compelling interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to 
 
 128 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019). An example of an emergency 
relevant to Facebook would be a Facebook account security problem. Id. at 1152. 
 129 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2020).  
 130 Duguid, at 1153. 
 131 Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 132 Duguid at 1153 (quoting Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Gomez v. 
Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2014)).  
 133 Id. at 1153. 
 134 Id. at 1153–54. 
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further that interest.135 The government argues that its compelling interest is in 
the protection of personal privacy.136 The court did not find this convincing since 
robocalls to collect debts infringe on the debtor’s privacy, and robocalls in 
general are typically considered to be invasive of privacy regardless of the 
purpose. The court reasoned that when citizens consent to robocalls, they are 
typically less intrusive of people’s privacy. The notion of giving consent to 
receive the call begins to lessen any heightened expectation of privacy that one 
may normally have.137 By not requiring consent for robocalls to collect debts 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States, the government’s own stated interest 
is not being met.138 
The government also offers an alternative interest aimed at protecting the 
public’s financial interests.139 Even if this is a compelling interest, the court does 
not believe that the debt collection exception is the least restrictive means to 
achieve its goals.140 The 2015 statute could have addressed the nature of the 
relationship between the debt collector and the debtor, instead of the content of 
the call, which would have made the statute content-neutral.141 By creating an 
exemption based on the relationship between the government and the debtor, 
instead of based on speech relating to debt collection, the statute would have 
avoided regulating the content of the speech. The court also asserts that the 
government could have either had live callers contacting debtors or could have 
decided to place the calls itself.142  
The Ninth Circuit held that because the debt-collection exception is content-
based and is not narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest, it 
violates the First Amendment.143 Some courts also examine whether the 
regulated speech constitutes commercial speech, which is a form of speech that 
is recognized as reflecting the economic interests of the parties. It is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny due to the government’s higher interest in regulating 
economic information directed to consumers.144 An explanation and analysis of 
commercial speech will be provided below. 
 
 135 Id. at 1154–56. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 138 Id. at 1155. 
 139 Id. at 1156.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 143 Id. 
 144 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558–73 (1980). 
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VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS: COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
When applying the First Amendment to determine whether a statute or 
regulation violates a person’s freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has 
recognized commercial speech as have its own category of regulated speech. 
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public 
Service Commission of New York defined commercial speech and set forth the 
applicable First Amendment test for regulating commercial speech.145 The 
Supreme Court defined commercial speech as an “expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”146 Commercial speech 
serves the speaker’s economic interests as well as society’s interest in receiving 
the “fullest possible dissemination of information.”147 The Supreme Court in 
Central Hudson also decided that commercial speech receives an intermediate 
level of scrutiny.148 In deciding to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny, the 
Court recognized that in traditional commercial speech, such as providing 
information through advertising, there is a greater governmental interest in 
suppressing messages that do not accurately inform consumers of relevant 
information.149  
The Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council held that for commercial speech, “a different degree of 
protection is necessary to ensure that the flow of truthful and legitimate 
commercial information is unimpaired.”150 In crafting its own intermediate 
scrutiny analysis to determine whether a statute or regulation improperly 
infringes on commercial speech, a court must examine:  
(1) Does the speech constitute a misleading or unlawful activity?  
a. If the speech is misleading or unlawful, then 
it is not protected under the First 
Amendment. 
(2) Does the state have a substantial interest in regulating the speech? 
 
 145 Id. at 558–66. 
 146 Id. at 561. 
 147 Id. at 561–62.  
 148 Id. at 573. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting agreement with the majority that an intermediate level 
of scrutiny for commercial speech is appropriate). 
 149 Id. at 560–72.  
 150 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n. 24 (1976)). In Friedman, the Supreme Court held that a Texas state 
statute prohibiting optometrists from using a trade name did not violate the First Amendment. The Court held 
that a trade name is a type of advertising for the types of services and goods that an optometrist provides its 
patients. The statute was upheld since it merely requires that the information portrayed to customers is accurate 
and not deceptive. This restriction does not prevent informational advertising to consumers. Id. 
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(3) Does the regulation directly advance the state’s interest? 
(4) Does the regulation achieve its goal by proportionate measures? 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 
S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Public Service Commission of 
the State of New York issued an order in December 1973 stating that all electric 
utilities across the state must stop all advertising that promotes electricity use.151 
At the time of the order, the Commission found that the state did not have enough 
fuel to meet customer demands. Three years later, the fuel shortage eased and 
the Commission extended the prohibition to include promotional advertising.152 
In making this decision, the Commission relied on the nation’s interest in 
preserving energy and its own interest in saving costs associated with energy 
production.153  
In applying its four-factor analysis, the Court in Central Hudson first 
recognized that the electric utilities’ speech is neither misleading nor 
unlawful.154 Second, the state’s interests is banning promotional advertising 
includes energy conservation and preventing extra energy costs for consumers 
during peak periods of energy use. Both of these concerns represent substantial 
government interests.155  
Third, the Court examines whether the regulation directly advances the 
state’s interests. The state’s interest in protecting energy costs has too indirect 
and speculative of a connection between the banned advertising and the 
perceived harm.156 On the other hand, the state’s interest in conserving energy 
use has an “immediate connection between advertising and demand for 
electricity.”157 Under the fourth criteria, the Court held that the total ban on 
 
 151 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980). 
 152 Id. at 559. 
 153 Id. at 558–60.  
 154 Id. at 566–68. One example of speech that does not receive First Amendment protection from the court 
is someone proposing to sell illegal drugs to another person. Because this is an unlawful activity, the commercial 
speech does not receive First Amendment protection and the Central Hudson test is not applied. A second 
example of unprotected speech is when a website author presents their site as collecting donations for hurricane 
relief when the money is actually going to a college student. This second example demonstrates misleading 
speech that would not receive First Amendment protection. Andrew L. Sullivant, Leave Me Alone! The Delicate 
Balance of Privacy and Commercial Speech in the Evolving Do-Not-Call Registry, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 
258–59 (2008–2009).  
 155 Id. at 568–69. 
 156 Id. at 569. The court highlighted that there are other factors that could impact energy costs outside of 
promotional advertising. The link between promotional advertising during off-peak energy use periods and 
increased energy use during peak-use periods is too indirect of a link to justify regulating commercial speech. 
Id. 
 157 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980). 
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promotional advertisements is more extensive than necessary to achieve the 
state’s goal.158 The appellant in this case argues that it would advertise products 
that are energy efficient, and the Commission failed to discredit those efficient 
alternative energy sources. In addition, the Commission could have only 
restricted the content of the advertising by requiring certain information to 
accompany the promotional materials so that consumers are more aware of 
energy concerns and energy prices.159 For these reasons, the regulation of the 
commercial speech violates the First Amendment.160  
Even though Central Hudson reviews commercial speech under intermediate 
scrutiny, there is uncertainty regarding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert forces commercial speech into a strict scrutiny standard 
of review. In Reed, the Court held that facially content-based regulations are 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s motive or content-
neutral justification.161 One school of thought is that the Court in Reed did not 
signal that it intended to subsume Central Hudson’s commercial speech test, did 
not reference Central Hudson in its reasoning, and that the sign regulations in 
Reed did not involve commercial speech.162 In a decision from the Northern 
District of California, the opinion stated, “The Supreme Court has clearly made 
a distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial speech, and 
nothing in its recent opinions, including Reed, even comes close to suggesting 
that that well-established distinction is no longer valid.”163 
Even though subsequent case law has distinguished commercial speech from 
a content-based strict scrutiny standard of review, other courts have held that 
strict scrutiny applies as long as the commercial speech is also content-based. 
Because the TCPA prohibits the use of autodialers when the express consent of 
the consumer is missing, this limitation is more likely to affect conveying certain 
types of information.164 Autodialers could relay telemarketing calls that qualify 
as commercial speech or could place calls relating to an individual’s financial 
information or personal health information.165 One could argue that because 
 
 158 Id. at 569–70. 
 159 Id. at 569–71.  
 160 Id. at 558.  
 161 Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1986–87 (2016) (citing 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).  
 162 Id. at 1990–92.  
 163 Id. at 1991–92 (quoting CTIA - The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061 
(N.D. Cal. 2015)).  
 164 Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: FIRST 
AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM THE FCC’S TCPA RULES, 84 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018). 
 165 Id. Using automated calls to relay this information is preferred since it reduces the chances that a 
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certain messages are better suited for autodialers, the content of speech relayed 
by autodialers is being regulated by the TPCA’s requirements.166 Because this 
is a content-based restriction, a court that is unwilling to differentiate between 
commercial speech and content-based speech would treat this provision under a 
strict scrutiny standard of review. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a Vermont 
statute “restricts the sale, disclosure, and use for pharmacy records that reveal 
the prescribing practices of individual doctors.”167 The Court reasoned that on 
its face, the law is a content-based restriction on the “sale, disclosure, and use of 
prescriber-identifying information.”168 Because the statute bars the sale or 
disclosure of the information for marketing purposes, which demonstrates a 
disfavor of marketing, the statute is regulating “particular content.”169 The Court 
points to legislative findings to demonstrate that due to the law’s purpose of 
“diminish[ing] the effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name 
drugs,”170 coupled with the content restriction on a type of speech, that Vermont 
is engaging in content-based view-point discrimination.171 
Along with the statute’s restrictions on marketing-related speech, Sorrell 
asserts that content-based regulation on commercial speech is justified to get a 
higher level of scrutiny when the government has a “legitimate interest in 
protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms.’”172 The Supreme Court in 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. asserted that because of the greater risk 
for confusion or deception in advertising messages, statutes can impose content-
based restrictions on commercial language.173 In Bolger, a federal law prohibited 
the unsolicited mailing of advertisements for contraceptives.174 The Court in 
Bolger relies on four factors taken together to hold that the mailings constitute 
commercial speech: (1) the speech proposes a commercial transaction, (2) the 
mailers consist of advertisements, (3) the advertisements refer to a specific 
product, and (4) the senders had an economic motivation for mailing the 
materials.175 The Court maintained that the appellants’ argument for shielding 
 
consumer’s personal information is leaked. Having a live person placing the call risks the confidentiality of the 
consumer’s personal information. Id. 
 166 Id.  
 167 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). The law prohibits pharmacies and health insurers 
from selling prescriber information and bars pharmacies from allowing prescriber-identifying information from 
being sold for marketing purposes. Id. 
 168 Id. at 564. 
 169 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.  
 170 Id. at 565. 
 171 Id. 564–65.  
 172 Id. at 579 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)).  
 173 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983).  
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. at 66–67.  
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people from getting these mailed materials because they may be found offensive 
is “classically not a justification validating the suppression of expression 
protected by the First Amendment.”176 
As will be seen below, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duguid refused 
to apply intermediate scrutiny, because Facebook’s messages did not amount to 
commercial speech. When reviewing the constitutionality of the TCPA with the 
debt collection exemption, the Duguid court applied a strict scrutiny standard of 
review to the TCPA. This decision was ultimately based on whether the statute 
on its face regulates or restricts forms of speech.177  
VII.  TCPA: IS STRICT SCRUTINY OR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY PROPER?  
Without the 2015 debt collection exception to TCPA consent requirements, 
the TCPA was viewed as a content-neutral law designed to protect consumer 
privacy.178 In Duguid, the plaintiffs argued that the exception for debt-collection 
calls made on behalf of the government is a content-based regulation subjecting 
the TCPA to strict scrutiny.179 The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York also followed this trend in its Mejia v. Time Warner Cable 
decision, in which the court also decided to apply strict scrutiny to the TCPA 
when examining the exemption for autodialed calls made in relation to debts 
guaranteed by the United States.180 Notably, the court recognized that the TCPA 
makes several distinctions between calls beyond just the debt collection 
exemption, such as between pre-recorded and autodialed calls versus live callers, 
as well as between calls made to wireless phones versus calls made to residential 
landline phones.181 These distinctions amount to content-based regulations of 
speech.  
Before applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the definition of 
commercial speech can be applied to determine whether TCPA communications 
constitute commercial speech. In Duguid under a TCPA analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected applying intermediate scrutiny to Facebook’s messages because 
the speech did not satisfy its court’s own definition of commercial speech used 
 
 176 Id. at 71 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977)).  
 177 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 178 Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2014); see Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 
926 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 179 Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1153.  
 180 Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech, 84 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. at 46–47 (citing Mejia v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-6445 (JPO), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120445, 
at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2017). 
 181 Id. at 50 
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in Hunt v. City of Los Angeles.182 The Ninth Circuit in Hunt stated that 
commercial speech is “‘defined as speech that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction’. . . . Where the facts present a close question, ‘strong 
support’ that the speech should be characterized as commercial speech is found 
where the speech is an advertisement, the speech refers to a particular product, 
and the speaker has an economic motivation.”183 In Duguid, the plaintiff did not 
have a Facebook account, was alerted to nonexistent account activity, and the 
messages did not advertise or relate to any product for purchase.184 Therefore, 
these security messages sent by an automated system do not constitute 
commercial speech.  
The primary goal of the TCPA is to protect home privacy interests and one’s 
interests in being free from unwanted communications.185 Under the Reed 
analysis, after determining if a statute on its face regulates content, the 
congressional intent or preference for speech can be inferred.186 Congress 
arguably had a preference for live speakers over pre-recorded telemarketers, 
which revealed a content preference against advertising and solicitations.187 Yet, 
Congress did not fully consider the utility of auto-dialed or pre-recorded calls. 
As the prevalence of wireless phones has increased and as businesses have more 
strongly relied on automated calls or pre-recorded calls to relay personal 
information, growing portions of content-based speech are being infringed upon 
by statute.188 For example, pre-recorded calls may seek to deliver sensitive 
information in a secure manner.189 In examining whether the calls constitute 
commercial speech, many of these pre-recorded calls do not propose a 
commercial transaction. Instead, they relay pertinent messages to consumers to 
keep them informed of various aspects of their lives. Because of the utility of 
these calls in relaying personal information to consumers in a secure manner, 
the trend in applying a strict scrutiny level of analysis should continue for TCPA 
regulated calls and FCC regulations that implement the TCPA.  
 
 182 Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1154 n.4. 
 183 Id. (citing Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011)).  
 184 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 185 Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech, 84 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. at 16–18. 
 186 Id. at 33. 
 187 Id. at 51–52.  
 188 Id. at 52–53.  
 189 Id. Examples of these calls could include updates on personal finances, travels information, medical 
information (including prescriptions or appointment reminders), or civic information. Id.  
HARRISONFINAL_5.7.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 9:36 AM 
94 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 7 
VIII. TRACED ACT  
A. The Creation of the TRACED Act 
On December 31, 2019, President Trump signed the Pallone-Thune 
Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act 
(TRACED Act).190 The law amends the TCPA to give power to the federal 
government to produce stronger response mechanisms and solutions to combat 
robocalls. The Act allows the FCC to have a longer statute of limitations to 
pursue illegal robocallers and permits imposing larger fines that will create a 
greater deterrent effect on robocallers.191 Specifically, the FCC is permitted to 
prosecute first-time robocallers for up to four years after the call. Fines for an 
intentional violation can total up to $10,000.192  
The Act calls on the FCC to establish an interagency task force to address 
the prosecution of illegal robocalls and the enforcement of robocall statutes.193 
Section 5 of the Act gives authority to the Department of Justice to prosecute 
robocalling violations that cause “economic harm, physical danger, or erosion 
of an inhabitant’s peace of mind and sense of security.”194 The interagency 
working group is to be composed of the Attorney General, and representatives 
from the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Federal Communications Commission, and Federal 
Trade Commission, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.195 The 
Attorney General is also permitted to include non-federal stakeholders with 
relevant expertise in the working group as they see fit.196 The working group is 
tasked with submitting a report to Congress on recommendations regarding the 
“(1) prevention and prosecution of such violations; and (2) a description of what 
progress . . . relevant Federal departments . . . have made.”197 
 
 190 Mitchell Brecher & Debra McGuire Mercer, TRACED Act Subjects Robocallers to Increased Penalties, 
Outlines Regulatory and Reporting Requirements to Deter Violations, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 8, 
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/traced-act-subjects-robocallers-to-increased-penalties-outlines-
regulatory-and. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id.  
 193 Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 5(a), 113 Stat. 3274. 
 194 TRACED Act § 5(b)(g). 
 195 TRACED Act § 5(c).  
 196 TRACED Act § 5(d). An example as a non-federal stakeholder with relevant expertise is a 
representative from the National Association of Attorneys General. Id.  
 197 TRACED Act § 5(e).  
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B. Barriers to Contact 
Along with its enforcement directives for federal agencies, the TRACED 
Act calls on all phone carriers to implement a STIR/SHAKEN Authentication 
Framework.198 This framework seeks to combat spoofing, which disguises an 
incoming phone number on caller-ID as a local number, making it more likely 
that someone answers the call.199 The FCC is required to mandate that phone 
providers implement the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework in areas 
with Internet access or to take reasonable steps to implement a similar call 
authentication system in areas without Internet access within 18 months of the 
passage of the Act.200 In areas with internet access, the FCC is instructed that if 
a phone provider has not adopted the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework, 
has not agreed to participate in the STIR/SHAKEN framework, has not begun 
to implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, or will not be capable of 
implementing the STIR/SHAKEN framework no later than 18 months after the 
passage of the Act, then the FCC shall penalize the carrier no later than 12 
months after the passage of the Act.201  
The TRACED Act includes a Safe Harbor provision, which charges the FCC 
to promulgate rules no later than one year after the passage of the Act that protect 
carriers from mistakes they may make when blocking calls.202 A phone provider 
is excused form liability for inadvertent call blocking when a call is misidentified 
due to their call authentication frameworks. In addition, the party that is 
adversely affected by the authentication framework may pre-emptively seek to 
verify the authenticity of their calls.203 The Safe Harbor provision also ensures 
that a carrier’s implementation of its call blocking framework cannot be added 
as an additional line item charge on a customer’s monthly phone bill.204 
 
 198 SHAKEN/STIR are standards employed when a call is travelling through “interconnected phone 
networks . . . [and] are ‘signed’ as legitimate by originating carriers and validated by other carriers before 
reaching consumers. SHAKEN/STIR digitally validates the handoff of phone calls passing through the complex 
web of networks, allowing the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is from the 
person making it.” Combatting Spoofed Robocalls with Caller Id Authentication, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/call-
authentication (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 199 “Spoofing is when a caller deliberately falsifies the information transmitted to your caller ID display 
to disguise their identity. Scammers often use neighbor spoofing so it appears that an incoming call is coming 
from a local number, or spoof a number from a company or a government agency that you may already know 
and trust.” Caller ID Spoofing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing-and-caller-id (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2020). 
 200 Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-105, §§ 4(b)(1)-4(b)(2), 113 Stat. 3274. 
 201 TRACED Act § 4(b)(2)(A). 
 202 TRACED Act § 4(c).  
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.  
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In conjunction with the FCC’s June 2019 Declaratory Ruling permitting 
consumers to opt-out of their phone carrier from proactively blocking 
robocalls,205 the TRACED Act stipulates that no later than 1 year after the 
passage of the Act, the Commission is charged with issuing a rule that ensures 
that robocall blocking services are provided to consumers with an opt-in or opt-
out option.206 The law requires that these services be provided at no additional 
charge to the consumer and that carriers should “make all reasonable efforts to 
avoid blocking emergency public safety calls.”207  
Section 8 of the TRACED Act states that there may be parties who are 
exempt from the statute’s consent requirements.208 Under the TCPA, FCC 
regulations, and Supreme Court holdings, auto-dialed and pre-recorded calls 
placed by the government and authorized government agents are exempt from 
having to secure written consent to contact individuals.209 Previously, this has 
been reasoned by emphasizing that the purpose of these calls, which is 
oftentimes to relay important information to citizens, is too important of a 
message to subject to further regulation.210 Section 8 stipulates that for any 
exemptions to robocall requirements, the FCC shall ensure that those calls are 
regulated as to “(1) the classes of parties that may make such calls; (ii) the classes 
of parties that may be called; and (iii) the number of such calls that a calling 
party may make to a particular called party.”211 
IX. DISCUSSION 
While it is important that consumers are protected from deceptive debt 
collection practices, it is also important to ensure that debt collection 
communications are not effectively eliminated altogether. Debt collection serves 
a valid purpose in ensuring that creditors are paid back for their loans. Ultimate 
failure by the debtor to repay these loans could have a dire impact on businesses 
that need to recover their loaned funds. In the discussion section, this Comment 
 
 205 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor, 
47 C.F.R. §64 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.  
 206 Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 10(b), 113 Stat. 3274.  
 207 TRACED Act § 10(b)(j)(1)(C).  
 208 TRACED Act § 8.  
 209 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1, 
8 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-16-
72A1.pdf; see Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 673–74. (2016)).  
 210 Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: FIRST 
AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM THE FCC’S TCPA RULES, 84 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018). 
 211 TRACED Act § 8. 
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will address FCC and CFPB regulatory shortcomings and solutions to these 
problems. Then, First Amendment analyses of the FDCPA and the TRACED 
Act will be conducted to determine whether the statutes withstand a First 
Amendment analysis by a reviewing court.  
A. Regulatory Concerns 
The FCC’s June 2019 declaratory ruling permitting opt-in call blocking tools 
bases its utilization of the tools on over-broad standards.212 Phone carriers 
deciding whether to block a call from a phone number is based on factors that 
include, “large bursts of calls in a short timeframe; low average call duration; 
low call completion ratios . . . a large volume of complaints related to a suspect 
line, [and] sequential dialing patterns.”213 Phone calls from debt collectors could 
have these characteristics, such as short call times and low call completion ratios, 
by virtue of the topic of the call. A consumer evading payment on a debt may 
hang up the phone once they hear that it is a debt collector or an automated voice 
on the other end of line. In addition, consumers having the option to block all 
calls from unknown numbers limits contact with debt collectors but also has 
wide ranging repercussions for other businesses with similar call 
characteristics.214  
Along with these regulatory limitations, the FDCPA has also greatly limited 
whom consumers speak with. Under the FDCPA, debtors are entitled to tell debt 
collectors that they wish to cease communication.215 The Supreme Court in 
Heintz v. Jenkins assured that a debtor would not be able to cut off litigation by 
ceasing communications, because the debt collector could argue that their 
communication with the debtor qualified as an effort to discuss either a special 
remedy or the pending litigation.216 Yet, contact by the debt collector’s lawyers 
to the creditor relating to the debt may result in further violation of the 
FDCPA.217 The Supreme Court is mistaken with its proposed defenses. 
Discussing the pending litigation, which could address settling a case or 
requesting documents for discovery, inherently relates to the debt collection 
 
 212 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor, 
47 C.F.R. §64 ¶25 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf. 
 213 Id. at §64 ¶35 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.  
 214 For example, a health care provider or a local municipality with pre-recorded or autodialed calls could 
experience similarly low call completion rates and low average call durations. 
 215 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
 216 Mattson, supra §1.06. (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–99 (1995)). 
 217 Romine, 155 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297–98 (1995)) (“Litigation . . . 
seems simply one way of collecting debt.”). 
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efforts. These FDCPA limitations could make it nearly impossible to 
communicate about a case without invoking additional FDCPA liability.  
To address these issues, the CFPB’s final rule should include clear 
exceptions for debt collection agencies that are trying to communicate with 
debtors on matters regarding official recourse and pending litigation. An 
example of permissible contact should include all communications between the 
attorneys of both parties. If the CFPB was actually concerned that litigation 
could qualify as communication with the debtor to retrieve owed debts, the rule 
would provide a total bar for communication between the creditor’s attorney and 
the debtor. As a solution, the rule could mandate that if communication directly 
with the debtor was absolutely necessary, or if the debtor is representing pro se, 
then communication must be done before a judge, mediator, or court appointed 
officer to ensure fair communication practices. By allowing necessary 
communication in a controlled and specific manner, debt collectors will be able 
to seek redress for harms suffered with less concern for whether they are 
exposing themselves to additional liability.  
In order to resolve the issue of consumers becoming completely unreachable 
to debt collectors, a reporting system could be created that would require debt 
collectors to submit annual data to the FCC, the CFPB, and Congress to 
demonstrate a good faith basis for communicating with consumers. If these 
entities list their legitimate purposes in contacting consumers within reasonable 
constraints imposed by statute or regulation, such as only placing calls during 
normal day-time hours and not dialing debtors while they are working at their 
place of employment, then they should enjoy greater leeway from the federal 
government in not having their communications limited or blocked from 
reaching consumers. Including call times and the number of completed calls will 
also provide concrete and accurate data for the FCC’s measure of reasonable 
analytics.218 By allowing debt collectors greater leeway based on good behavior 
mechanisms, collectors will have greater incentives to comply with federal 
regulations and regain public trust.  
Federal agencies could also move to require debt collectors to make live 
phone calls whose contents are recorded for monitoring purposes. Monitoring 
these calls could help to ensure that collectors do not employ harassment 
techniques. By forcing collectors to only use live phone calls, the number of 
 
 218 The FCC’s 2019 declaratory ruling permitted phone companies to utilize reasonable analytics to 
determine whether a call should be blocked from a consumer’s phone. FCC AFFIRMS ROBOCALL BLOCKING BY 
DEFAULT TO HELP PROTECT CONSUMERS, Federal Comm. Commission (June 6, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/ 
public/attachments/DOC-357852A1.pdf. 
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deceptive and harassing pre-recorded or auto-dialed calls could decrease, debt 
collectors could work to ensure that they are paid back in full, and debt collection 
calls would still be able to reach debtors for their intended purpose.  
In addition, the CFPB should take more seriously the issue of regulating 
limited content messages.219 The CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking fails to 
provide clear protections to consumers on how they can protect themselves and 
opt-out of receiving text messages, e-mails, and voicemails from debt 
collectors.220 The notice lacked guidance to the public on whether the agency is 
leaning towards favoring a cap on the number of limited content messages that 
can be sent to consumers within a given period.221 The National Consumer Law 
Center highlights that the CFPB should ensure that consumers are able to 
directly opt-out of receiving limited content messages on the platform from 
which they receive messages, instead of requiring formal and time consuming 
opt-out procedures via written mail.222 Consumers should be able to send a reply 
text message or dial a callback number to indicate that they wish to opt-out of 
receiving further limited content messages. In addition, the CFPB should 
commit to placing maximum caps on the number of limited content messages 
sent to debtors. By allowing an unlimited number of messages to be sent, 
individuals will be inundated with communications that will make rectifying 
their debts even more confusing and cumbersome.223  
In conclusion, the FCC and CFPB should work to create clearer measures 
and tools to aid debt collectors in recovering debts without incurring additional 
liability from federal agencies. Congress has enacted statutes that seek to both 
regulate debt collection practices and restrict robocalls. Robocalls encompass a 
wider array of solicitation calls beyond just debt collection. By strictly regulating 
these calls, greater First Amendment concerns arise over whether the statutes 
violate the freedom of speech. The FDCPA and the TRACED Act will both be 
analyzed. For each statute, this Comment will examine whether the statutes are 
 
 219 Limited-content message is a term used to identify the amount of information that a debt collector is 
allowed to include in messages sent to consumers without invoking the requirements of being a communication 
under the FDCPA. Examples typically include text messages, e-mails, and voicemails. Debt Collection Practices 
Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 at 6 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-
collection-NPRM.pdf. 
 220 The notice only proposes that limited content messages provide instructions to consumers on how to 
opt-out of receiving the messages. The notice fails to outline simple or modern methods on how consumers 
should be allowed to opt-out. Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), supra at 7.  
 221 Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), supra at 6–7.  
 222 CFPB Debt Collection Rule Must Protect Consumers, Not Abusive Collections May 2019, NATIONAL 
CONSUMER LAW CENTER 1, 1 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/cfpb-debt-collection-
rule-summary-2019.pdf. 
 223 Id. 
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content-based, content-neutral, or constitute commercial speech. Then the 
appropriate level of scrutiny will be applied to the statutes to determine whether 
the statutes are constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.  
B. First Amendment Statutory Concerns 
The policies set forth by the FDCPA and TRACED Act both restrict callers 
and include provisions that allow phone carriers and consumers to implement 
and utilize systems that would block robocalls from reaching consumers’ 
phones. With governmental authority to both preemptively block calls and 
implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, the issue arises of whether these 
call-blocking technologies stifle speech. Each of these laws will be evaluated 
based on their content and whether they constitute commercial speech.224 To 
determine whether the statutes violate the First Amendment, the appropriate 
level of scrutiny will be applied to the laws. The FDCPA will be evaluated first 
and the TRACED Act will be evaluated second.  
1. First Amendment and the FDCPA 
It is important to examine the FDCPA to determine whether the statute sets 
forth permissible constraints on speech relating to debt collection under the First 
Amendment. First, to determine whether the FDCPA’s requirements violate the 
First Amendment, one must decide whether the statute is content-neutral or 
content-based.225 There is a strong argument that the statute is content-based and 
violates the First Amendment. The statute on its face directly limits speech 
relating to debt collection. It does so by specifically regulating the manner by 
which debt collection calls are made, prohibiting inappropriate and harassing 
content, and granting debtors the ability to end all communication relating to the 
debt.226 The intended individuals affected by the statute are debt collectors. 
Because the statute on its face expresses a preference disfavoring debt collection 
 
 224 Because the constitutionality of the TCPA was challenged under a First Amendment framework in 
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc. and Mejia v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., the statute is omitted from the First Amendment 
analysis. 
 225 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019); See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2224–33 (explaining that content-based statutes are presumed to be unconstitutional, because they regulate 
speech based on its subject matter; See (David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) 
(explaining that content-neutral statutes regulate speech by limiting expression without concern for the substance 
of the speech itself, oftentimes by regulating the time, place, and manner of the speech).  
 226 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
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calls and singles out a specific class of individuals,227 the statute is content-based 
and is analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard of review.228  
Even though the statute appears to be content-based, one could argue that 
the regulated speech qualifies as commercial speech. The debt collection calls 
being placed represent the economic interests of the creditor, and public policy 
favors consumers having an expansive knowledge of information that directly 
relates to their financial interests.229 Under a Central Hudson intermediate 
scrutiny analysis,230 we will first presume that the debt collection practices are 
not misleading or unlawful activity. Second, the state arguably has a substantial 
interest in regulating this speech to prevent harmful debt collection practices. 
However, under the third prong of the Central Hudson commercial speech 
analysis, the regulations limiting the manner through which the calls are placed 
do not directly advance the state’s interest in regulating harmful debt collection 
practices. The FDCPA asserts that people who collect consumer debts that are 
not at default at the time of purchase of the debt are not held as debt collectors 
under the meaning of the statute. By failing to regulate debt collectors who are 
taking advantage of debtors who are unaware of whether their debt is actually in 
default, the statute is under inclusive in preventing harmful debt collection 
practices and fails to directly advance the state’s interest.  
Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis,231 the FDCPA does 
not achieve its goal by proportionate means. Under the statute, debt collectors 
cannot cause the phone to ring repeatedly and continuously with the intent to 
“annoy, abuse, or harass” the person who is called.232 The consumer is also 
permitted to notify the debt collector that they either refuse to pay the debt or 
express their wish for the debt collector to stop further communication.233 These 
provisions are not proportionate to the goals of the Act. Determining whether a 
caller had the intent to annoy or harass a debtor seems like an entirely subjective 
analysis that cannot be found by a trier of fact without some form of call logging 
by the debt collector. In addition, allowing a debtor to cut off all communication 
 
 227 The Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert recognized that singling out a particular group via 
statute is not dispositive of a statute being content-based. Rather, this factor should be analyzed with the totality 
of the statute. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015).  
 228 Id. at 2227.  
 229 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980). 
 230 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 
(1980). 
 231 Id.  
 232 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692(d) (LexisNexis 2019).  
 233 KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. 
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from a debt collector, who may have good reason to regularly contact a debtor, 
is an overly broad moratorium on creditor-debtor contact that precludes 
productive and informative conversations between the two sides. Because the 
statute is not able to satisfy the Central Hudson four-part inquiry, the FDCPA 
would fail a commercial speech First Amendment analysis.  
If the speech does not constitute commercial speech and is held as being 
content-based, then under a strict scrutiny analysis, it would fail.234 The 
government could argue that there is a compelling government interest to protect 
individuals from debt collection calls that harass debtors. However, the statute 
is not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. The statute is over-inclusive, 
because it permits individuals to cut off communication with creditors.235 For 
example, attorneys for the debt collector, after being notified of debtor’s wishes 
to end communications, have to avoid communications with the debtor that are 
not specifically related to the unfolding litigation, which puts the debt collector 
in a difficult position to decipher whether the communication regarding 
litigation actually relates to the subject of debt collection. This is very nuanced 
and easily subject to error by even the most careful of attorneys or parties. In 
addition, repeated phone calls can easily be viewed as harassment. In reality, a 
debt collector who is trying to reach a debtor may have called back after the 
phone line was disconnected. The debt collector may have the purpose of 
making honest and well-intentioned contact with a debtor. However, the statute 
presupposes mal-intent, placing debt collectors immediately in the realm of 
harassment and liability. Because the statute is over-inclusive and is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal, it should fail a strict scrutiny analysis by 
the court.  
2. First Amendment and the TRACED Act  
The TRACED Act must first be evaluated to determine whether the statute 
is content-neutral or content-based. The TRACED Act would most likely be 
considered a content-neutral statute, because unlike the TCPA, the law does not 
make specific exceptions for particular types of calls. The statute is concerned 
with stopping illegal robocalls and implements frameworks to prevent spoofing, 
which is a deceptive practice that does not constitute a particular type of 
 
 234 One could argue that the regulated speech does not constitute commercial speech, because under the 
Supreme Court’s commercial speech factor analysis in Bolger, the reviewing court would need to know that the 
regulations restricts speech relating to advertisements and products for sale. Collecting debts may not necessarily 
qualify as satisfying either of these two categories. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 
(1983).  
 235 Mattson, supra.  
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protected speech.236 Because the statute is content-neutral, it will fall under an 
intermediate scrutiny analysis.237 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the statute must 
further an important government interest and must do so by means that are 
substantially related to that interest.238 Here, the government’s interest in 
preventing robocalls that harass and invade the privacy of consumers is likely to 
be viewed as an important goal. In addition, the government’s mandate to 
carriers to adopt the STIR/SHAKEN frameworks is substantially related to that 
interest. Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the statute would most likely 
not violate the First Amendment. 
The issue of whether the calls constitute commercial speech is immaterial. 
First, the statute is content-neutral, which ensures an intermediate level of 
scrutiny. Second, the TRACED Act seeks to curb illegal robocalls and combats 
fraudulent spoofing calls from reaching consumers. The Supreme Court in 
Central Hudson asserted that the First Amendment does not protect illegal 
speech,239 and the TRACED Act is concerned with combatting illegal calls and 
preventing callers from fraudulently hiding their identities from consumers.240 
Central Hudson defined commercial speech as, “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”241 If the robocall is placed 
for fraudulent purposes, then call does not pertain to a true economic interest of 
the audience and should not be considered commercial speech. Because the 
statute is mainly concerned with illegal robocalls that serve no utility and 
deceive the consumer into answering the phone, the calls do not elevate to the 
status of constituting commercial speech.242  
Section 8 of the TRACED Act grants the FCC the authority to implement 
additional protections for consumers from robocalls that can be placed without 
 
 236 Combatting Spoofed Robocalls with Caller Id Authentication, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/call-
authentication (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 237 David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 
(1980). 
 240 Mitchell Brecher & Debra McGuire Mercer, TRACED Act Subjects Robocallers to Increased Penalties, 
Outlines Regulatory and Reporting Requirements to Deter Violations, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 8, 
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/traced-act-subjects-robocallers-to-increased-penalties-outlines-
regulatory-and. 
 241 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.  
 242 Because the calls do not constitute commercial speech, one could not rely on the argument in Bolger, 
that due to the greater risk for confusion or deception in advertising messages, the statute could be analyzed as 
being content-based restrictions on commercial speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 
(1983).  
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the consent of the consumer,243 which post-Duguid could include exemptions 
for the federal government and authorized third parties under agency law. One 
could argue that by including the exempted robocalls by reference, Section 8 of 
the TRACED Act is content-based. Like the debt collection exemption, these 
exemptions could continue to permit favoring certain forms of speech, such as 
government communications, over other forms of speech. This provision of the 
statute could be viewed as an implicit content-based regulation and should then 
be reviewed under strict scrutiny.  
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a court could follow the same arguments set 
forth in Duguid, that either the goal is not compelling or that the statute is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve its goals.244 If the exempted calls are placed for 
emergency communications, then the government has a stronger case for a 
compelling interest to overcome a strict scrutiny analysis. If the purpose of the 
communication is for a government contractor to reach a citizen, the government 
may have a more difficult time arguing that the statute is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that goal or that there is no less intrusive means to reach that goal. An 
example of a less intrusive means to achieve this communication without an 
exemption would be to require a live person to place the call or to get consent 
from the individual. The government could have also achieved its goal through 
a content-neutral means by permitting auto-dialed calls for pre-existing 
relationships with the federal government. If a reviewing court finds that Section 
8 of the TRACED Act violates the First Amendment, then the statute has a 
severability clause that states that the section may be held to be invalid and that 
the remainder of the Act shall be unaffected.245  
In October 2019, Facebook Inc. asked the Supreme Court to review the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Duguid v. Facebook Inc.246 The Ninth Circuit invalidated 
the debt collection exception but left the rest of the TCPA intact.247 On appeal, 
the Court may have the opportunity to strike down the entire TCPA. The 
Supreme Court would also have the opportunity to examine the additional TCPA 
exemptions. Striking down the exemptions or the whole of the TCPA would 
 
 243 Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 8, 113 Stat. 3274. 
 244 Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 245 Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 15, 113 Stat. 3274. 
 246 Alexis Kramer, Facebook Asks Supreme Court to Decide Robocall Law’s Validity (1), BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X8BJRGVC000000?bna_news_filter=tech-
and-telecom-law&jcsearch. 
 247 Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1156–57.  
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likely impact the future of the TRACED Act, which includes exemption 
provisions and seeks to limit similar forms of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Congress, the CFPB, and the FCC need to work together to 
create clearer guidelines for regulating debt collection practices. The FCC’s call 
blocking services based on reasonable analytics are overbroad and do not take 
into account that the nature of debt collection calls inherently have some of the 
key characteristics that the agency looks for in fraudulent calls. The CFPB in its 
final agency rule should create good faith frameworks that permit debt collectors 
to make contact with debtors, regardless of debtors’ wishes to cut off 
communication, for litigation and appropriate debt collection purposes. The 
CFPB should also seriously address the issue of limited content messages and 
put in place meaningful and protective measures for consumers that are also fair 
to debt collectors trying to make contact with debtors. The FDCPA should be 
amended to include meaningful limits on the ability of a debtor to cut of nearly 
all communication with the debt collector or the debt collector’s attorney. By 
creating safeguards for appropriate communication, debt collectors will not risk 
additional FDCPA liability for simply trying to contact the debtor on matters 
related to litigation or settling the dispute. These safeguards would both protect 
the debt collector’s interest in being able to recover their funds as well as the 
debtor’s interests in not being pressured or treated unfairly by the debt collector 
and their attorney.  
First Amendment concerns relating to the FDCPA and the TRACED Act are 
valid. Under a First Amendment analysis, the FDCPA would most likely fail a 
content-based strict scrutiny standard of review by any court, because its means 
are not narrowly tailored to its compelling interest. Under a commercial speech 
analysis, the FDCPA could also fail a First Amendment analysis since the 
regulation does not directly advance the state’s interest and does not achieve the 
government’s goal by proportionate means. The TRACED Act, with the 
exception of Section 8 recognizing the exemptions to consent requirements, 
would most likely pass a First Amendment analysis under a content-neutral 
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Yet, the Supreme Court has not yet 
reviewed the entirety of the TCPA. The Supreme Court’s ruling on the  
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constitutionality of the entire TCPA could have a major impact on deciding 
whether the TRACED Act could withstand a First Amendment analysis by a 
reviewing court.  
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